William Clifford-Brown

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My Background



University of Manchester englishuknorth.com


Previous Research

Masters Project

- SIRS model of epidemics
- Adaptive network
- Frequency power spectrum
- J. Stat. Mech. (2012) P08018



SIRS Model



Project Goals

Financial and socio-economic systems

- Optimal strategies in illiquid markets
- Systematic financial risk
- Inference using machine learning

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- Paris
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Work so far...







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




 u_2




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Expected payoff for bird i from going to site m

$$E[u_m] = u_m p(t_m^i, s_m^i) + (u_n - c)(1 - p(t_m^i, s_m^i))$$

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This shows the difference between profits of the bird with the most and the other. $u_1 = 2$, $u_2 = 1$, c = 0.5

4 D > 4 B > 4 B > B = 900

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Bird *i* will calculate the proportion of time resources are unoccupied, τ_m , by summing the proportion of time the resource is occupied by other birds, τ_m^j .

$$\tau_{m} = \sum_{j \neq i}^{N} \tau_{m}^{j}$$

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Bird i will then use this, along with t_m^i and s_m^i as before, to compare expected payoffs.

$$E[u_m] = p_i^m u_m + (1 - p_i^m)(u_n p_i^n - c + (1 - p_i^n)(\Pi - c))$$


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$$u_m - \frac{c}{p(t_m^i, s_m^i, \tau_m)} \ge u_n - \frac{c}{p(t_n^i, s_n^i, \tau_n)}$$



4 D > 4 A > 4 B > 4 B > B = 900

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So what's the point?

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So what's the point?

Property rights

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So what's the point?

Property rights

Further Research

• Identify the phase transition

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Thank you for your attention

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